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I. THE SETTING
The present electric utility environment is exemplified by
uncertainties in demand, in fuel and operating costs, and, significantly
in capital costs and finance. From a time only a few years ago in which
load growth increased evenly at between 3 and 10% annually, load growth
is now less certain and variable between 1 and 3% annually for many
utilities in the United States. The result of this uncertainty in demand
growth has been to make long-term capacity planning increasingly
difficult. Some electric utilities have found themselves with excess
capacity (though possibly of the wrong fuel type), others with
insufficient capacity. These capacity short and longfalls have largely
had the same result; unhappy customers, and in most instances unhappy
regulatory bodies attempting to respond to pressures both from customers
and from the utilities themselves.
The second significant source of uncertainty for the utilities is in
the area of fuel costs and availability. Many utilities switched from
"dirty" fuels such as coal to the cleaner fuels of oil and natural gas in
the late '60s and early '70s only to find in 1973 that the fuel that
might be the cleanest was uncertain both in its price and in its
availability. For regions such as the Northeast and the North Central
which are heavily dependent upon foreign oil imports this has meant that
their price for electrical power has risen far more rapidly than has been
the case for other regions with, say, large hydro resources. The result
has been an increase in the price ratio between the most expensive state
to the least expensive state of a factor of over 6 in average cost to a
residential consumer. The price fluctuations and uncertainties in
availability have had an additional unsettling impact on the utilities
and their customers. They have introduced the concept of the monthly
fuel adjustment charge, which reflects the real cost of generation either
during the immediately preceding month or the average of the preceding
two to four months. The result has been an increased awareness on the
part of both industrial and residential customers of one of the realities
of electrical power--it costs more to generate during certain seasons of
the year than during others. The presence or absence of a single nuclear
generating facility from a system can be worth a 5-second clip on the
evening news and a shift of several cents in the fuel adjustment charge.
The presence of rapidly changing fuel costs and uncertain sources of
supply have added greatly to the planning woes of the electric power
industry.
The third major source of uncertainty facing the utility industry is
increased capital and financing costs. The rapid oil increases of the
'70s have been felt throughout the economic structure of the U.S. where
double-digit inflation and prime interest rates near 20% have become the
norm. This has affected utility ability to raise capital and to obtain
bonding for long term capital projects. Given the current inflation
rate, the estimated cost of common building materials in a major
construction project such as a nuclear or coal-fired plant, which takes
between 8 and 12 years to build, will have doubled after the first seven
years. Hence, additional trips to the capital market prior to completion
of the project are often required.
It is not possible to complete a discussion of the uncertainties
associated with the current utility environment without mention of the
influence of regulators on both day-to-day operations and on the
structure of the utility industry in the decades ahead. New federal
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legislation such as the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PL 95-617)
has had, and will continue to have, a major impact on utilities.
Regulations on fuel use, energy conservation, and environmental impacts
have significantly adjusted the utility's operating strategies.
Regulation concerning the operation and licensing of nuclear power plants
have greatly influenced the availability of new generating
facilities--particularly since Three Mile Island.
In summary, the utility environment has inherently changed over the
last decade. Uncertainty is now a significant component of daily
operations and planning. To look back with some sense of longing to the
relatively simpler environment of the past may be academically
interesting but is certainly not productive. This paper looks to the
future.
While there has been a major negative impact during the '70s from
increased inflation and increased uncertainties in the utility
environment, the '70s brought to the utility industry, as they did to
virtually every facet of the economy, a near revolution in computational
and communications capability. The development of the integrated circuit
and its proliferation into intelligent machinery has given the utility
industry an increased ability to control its own operations as well as to
potentially control customer loads. In addition, the increase in
communications capability has meant that the utility, which formerly
communicated with even its largest customers only through a monthly bill,
is now technically able to communicate with customers in real time much
as it already does with other utilities and between its own plants and
dispatchers.
4Examples of the use of intelligent control and advanced
communications equipment abound both in industrial facilities and within
utilities themselves. Energy price increases of the past decade have
made the need to monitor and control overall energy use in many
manufacturing facilities a major money-saving proposition and a
microprocessor-based industry has arisen to meet these needs. The
utilities have also been able to benefit from the increased availability
of both microprocessing and efficient communication facilities. The
modern dispatch center is a sophisticated computer facility with sensing
and computational facilities at individual substations and communcations
in real time between facilities to monitor, adjust and react in emergency
situations. The future described in this paper involves the expansion of
this computational and communication capability to further integration of
the utilities and their customers.
Load management offers a means of adjustment on the part of the
utility and its customers to uncertainty in supplies and prices and to
uncertainties in system operations. It also takes advantage in some
instances, of the revolution in microprocessing and communications.
Today there are two major categories of load management schemes, those
that are direct or physical, and those that are indirect or economic.
Direct load control is characterized by an on/off switch whose action
is generally initiated by the utility itself. Examples of direct-load
control devices range from time clocks attached to hot water heaters to
highly sophisticated signaling to devices which use customer-specified
priority logic to limit the kW demand of a specific facility. Within the
range of devices lies a myriad whose purpose is to allow the utility to
remove--generally as rapidly as possible--all or a portion of a
5customer's load on the basis that the customer receives a reduction in
the overall bill in some fashion. This method of load management appears
to provide the utility with a "direct" control but, in practice, the
actual response can only be estimated statisically as the utility does
not know which devices are actually being used at a given time. One of
its disadvantages is that increased utilization of such control causes
customers to either refuse to accept it or try methods to circumvent it.
A major disadvantage is that the control actions are initiated with no
knowledge of customer priorities, needs or costs at a given time.
The second type of load management considered here is indirect or
economic management. There have been a number of experiments and now
there are a considerable number of utilities for which at least a portion
of customer loads are on some form of time-of-use or time-of-day rate.
This allows for some level of customer efficiency in deciding the amount
of electricity that will be consumed at a given time. However, it has
the disadvantage of not being sensitive to uncertainties such as plant
outages, short-term weather effects, and coal strikes. Thus it does not
account for the actual marginal cost of energy.
Despite their shortcomings, however, direct and indirect load
management methods have become significant concepts considered by most
utilities. Their use has emphasized the willingness and need for the
utility and the customer to communicate.
The concepts which follow in this paper are built upon the knowledge
that the utility of the future will be a new-breed utility whose
environment will be far more uncertain but whose management options will
be far greater based largely on computation and communications
capabilities. The following concepts build heavily upon knowledge of
6the existing and evolving utility industry; upon the revolution in
computation and communication, and upon the efforts to date in both
direct and indirect load management. The concepts may appear to be
revolutionary but are actually evolutionary. They blend many various
ideas into a complete package, combining computation and communication
with utility operations in real time. Most significantly, they combine
the customer and the utility into a single system--a marketplace--in
which both can enter, trade, and benefit. The marketplace retains the
good features of present-day load management techniques while
simultaneously removing most of their disadvantages.
II. THE RESPONSE
Our response to the problems of today's utilities is called
Homeostatic Control. Homeostastic Control is founded on two major
principles:
o Feedback Between Customer and Utility
o Customer Independence
It is to the advantage of both the customer and the utility that the
electric power system be planned and operated as economically and
physically efficiently as possible subject to constraints on
environmental quality and on system integrity. Historically, this has
been the sole task of the utility. Customers have rarely received direct
feedback from the utility concerning the overall cost of operation and
maintenance of the system integrity. Hence, customers have had little
opportunity to adapt their behavior to utility needs. Utilities have
rarely received direct feedback from customers concerning the type of
service and reliability the customers would really like to buy. This
7lack of feedback results in higher costs for both the utility and the
customer. Homeostatic Control provides the missing feedback.
At the same time that it is important to have a close interaction
between customers and the utility, it is equally important for customers
to make independent decisions. It is more efficient for a customer to
make the decision to reschedule or even to shed load than it is for an
external source, such as an electric utility controller, to make the
decision to manage or shed customer load. Industrial customers are far
more able to judge the value of electricity to their processes at any
given point in time than is the utility controller who has little, if
any, information concerning the process. From the utility's point of
view, it is important not to be forced into the politically dangerous
position of having to play the "big brother" who decides how and when
customers are going to use their processes, appliances, or other usage
devices. Under Homeostatic Control the utility does not "cross the meter
line" and the customer retains complete freedom of decision making.
Homeostatic Control achieves the two principles of feedback and
independence using the concepts of an energy marketplace. The energy
marketplace is a practical reality because of the major revolution taking
place in microelectronic communications and control.
The structure of the overall energy marketplace is illustrated in
Figure 1. The "Marketplace Controller" consists of human-computer teams
and communication systems that control, operate, and maintain the
security of the overall power system, establish prices, and conduct
certain transactions. The Marketplace Controller performs all of the
functions of present energy control centers, distribution control
centers, etc., plus additional functions resulting from the marketplace
I Marketplace Controller
-A I
4 Information Consultants
*4 Energy Brokers
~~J4..
* Electric Energy Flows 4--:
* Information Data Flows 4---*
Figure I. The Energy Marketplace
* Bulk Generation/Storage
* Distribution Generation/
Storage
9itself. Information Consultants provide forecasts of future price
behavior and/or recommendations for action. Energy Brokers buy and sell
long-term contracts for electric energy. These brokers provide a futures
(commodity) market in electric energy. A deeper understanding of the
individual roles will develop as the discussion proceeds. A key actor in
the overall energy marketplace not shown in Figure 1 is the regulatory
commission.
An energy marketplace can have different types of transactions taking
place. Transactions can involve real energy, reactive energy, and
various measures of dynamic behavior over time. Transactions can include
different types of price-quantity relationships with price-quantity links
ranging from complete prespecification to open marketplace devices. Time
intervals between price changes and decisions can range from years to
seconds or less.
The following discussion does not attempt to cover the full spectrum
of all possible marketplace transactions and control actions. Instead
the discussions concentrate on selected particular concepts involving
"energy pricing" and "dynamics pricing."
II.1 Energy Pricing
The two quantities of concern under energy pricing are the amount of
real energy (kilowatt hours) and reactive energy (kilovar hours) used or
generated. Two types of associated transactions are spot pricing and
utility-customer contracts.
Spot pricing is a concept in which the price of electricity varies in
response to the cost of supply and supply-demand conditions. Rates are
computed by the Marketplace Controller and transmitted to the customers
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in any one of several ways. Two examples of spot prices are:
o 5-Minute Update: Spot prices (buy and sell, real and reactive)
are recomputed every 5 minutes based partly on existing utility
economic dispatch optimization programs which track system fuel
costs in real time. Communication is done in real time over any
of several electronic links.
o 24-Hour Update: Spot prices (buy and sell) are precomputed once
a day for each hour of the next day, based partly on utility
unit commitment logics which forecast the next day's cost.
Communication of the 24 numbers is achieved by newspaper
publication and by providing customers with a telephone number
to dial if they prefer.
Obviously, these two examples only illustrate the range of possibilities.
Spot prices are determined by consideration of:
o Economics: Cost of fuel, capital, maintenance, etc.
o Quality of Supply: Present and expected future voltage,
frequency, and availability of power.
If, for example, total demand is approaching total available generation,
quality of supply considerations could increase spot buy and sell prices
beyond that indicated by direct utility expenditures to reflect the extra
pricing forces needed to prevent system collapse. A "socially optimum'
pricing theory encompassing all costs (utility, and customer) has been
developed which automatically covers both economics and quality of
supply. This theory is summarized in terms of "An Optimum Spot Pricing
Theorem" in Figure 2. Spot pricing eliminates block rates, demand
charges, ratchet clauses, hours use charges, and penalties charged for
back-up power except as justified by cost of transformer-distribution
line hardware.
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Customers respond to changing spot prices by adapting service
requirements that are reschedulable or nonessential. Customers respond
to forecasts of future spot price behavior as well as the current spot
price. Customers who have their own generation consider forecasts of
both buy and sell prices. Such forecasts are either self-generated or
are obtained from the Information Consultants.
In addition to spot prices, prespecified contracts involving real and
reactive energy options of various types can exist. Two main categories
of contracts are:
o Customer Exercised Options: Customer purchases options to buy
or sell energy in the future from the Energy Brokers.
o Marketplace Exercised Options: Marketplace Controller purchases
options to exercise control over generation and load now and in
the future.
Customer Exercised options involve long-term contracts with Energy
Brokers ranging in duration from days to years which give the customers
rights to buy or sell some quantity or range of quantitites of energy
with some time dependent restrictions for some prespecified explicit
range of prices. Such long term contracts can provide insurance to those
customers who feel a special need; albeit at a higher average price.
They also allow customers to speculate in the long-term market if they so
desire.
In an ideal world, where spot prices are established and communicated
instantaneously and where customers always respond in their own best
interest, pricing would be the only tool the Marketplace Controller would
need to ensure satisfactory marketplace operations, in both economic and
AN OPTIMUM SPOT PRICING THEOREM
Figure 2
o IF
o Generation-transmission-distribution outages, weather, and
customer desire are exogenous random variables
o Decisions on real and reactive energy generated and used by each
participant are constrained by
o Individual device capacities
o (Total generation) - (Total Usage) - (Losses) = 0
o Network Constraints
o Line Flows
o Voltage Magnitudes
o Criterion of optimality is to maximize
Global Social Value to Cost of Fuel Investment Cost
Welfare = User - for - o Generation
Generation o Network
o Usage
o THEN
o Optimum behavior results if each individual participant
maximizes own welfare given a spot price for energy (real and
reactive) set by:
Spot Marginal Fuel Quality of Losses
Price = Costs + Supply +
o Quality of Supply is not zero if
o Insufficient generation is available
o Network constraints are active
o Spot prices are equal for generation and usage
COROLLARIES
o Optimum spot price involves
o No demand charges
o No capacity credits-debits
o No backup charges
o No ratchet clauses
o Generation investment costs are met from marginal fuel profits
plus generation quality of supply prices
o Network operating and investment costs are met from
Net Marketplace Total Money Paid Total Money Paid to
Revenue = by all Users - all Generators
where the net marketplace revenues come from loss revenues plus
network quality of supply.
o Optimal spot pricing automatically leads to optimal dispatching
by generating plants, without a need for central dispatching.
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engineering senses. However, ideal worlds only exist in the classroom.
Marketplace Controller exercised options adjust to the real world.
Marketplace Controller exercised options usually involve short-term
contracts with durations ranging from seconds to hours. Microshedding is
an especially important concept which falls into this category.
Microshedding solves the dilemma of how the utility can have the
direct load control that is often desirable without crossing the meter
line. Microshedding can be viewed as a method for customers to buy the
particular mix of firm and non-firm (microsheddable) energy that fits
their needs. Under microshedding the utility and the customer negotiate
a contract for quantity control under which the customer will reduce
energy consumption to a prespecified level at the option of the
Marketplace Controller. The customer chooses, a priori, the level of
firm energy desired and, when called upon, specificies what operations
will be shed or rescheduled. Microshedding is an interruptible rate that
is renegotiated as frequently as every few minutes or as infrequently as
annually. The important concept is that the customer chooses what will
be affected, the utility determines when. For customers who are also
under spot pricing, microshedding contracts cover energy usages only up
to the time of the next spot price update.
In the near term at least, many customers will not see rapidly
updated spot prices and will not be involved in microshedding. This
means that the Marketplace Controller may have to exercise direct
rationing controls. In theory, if there are both spot and non-spot
customers and if there is a generation shortage, the spot price should be
raised only to a certain level, after which it becomes socially optimal
to ration the non-spot customers by subjecting them to rotating
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blackouts. By analogy with the different types of spot prices, two
examples of rationing are the 5-minute warning rationing and the 24-hour
warning rationing.
11.2 Dynamics Pricing
Electric power systems are built to provide real electric energy to
customer usage devices. However, the nature of the physical system leads
to spot prices for reactive energy. In a similar fashion, it may be
desirable to have marketplace transactions on quantities which affect the
dynamic nature and behavior of the physical system.
Two basic categories of "dynamics pricing" are
o Time Response Pricing: Economic incentives are based on the
explicit time history of a customer's response to a particular
situation.
o Dynamic Characteristic Pricing: Economic incentives are based
on a customer's general behavior characteristics.
One example of "time response pricing" is to pay customers extra during
emergency conditions when system frequency is deviating significantly
from 60 Hz if they decrease demand when frequency is low and increase
demand when frequency is high. An example of "dynamic characteristic
pricing" is to charge customers extra if their equipment tends to cause
low amplitude, lightly dampened power system oscillations. Another
example is to charge customers whose equipment generates harmonics.
For customers with their own generators, dynamics pricing is a way to
motivate them economically to install governors, voltage regulators,
etc., which help the power system's dynamic behavior.* However, even
*An alternative to dynamics pricing is the use of standards. This is
theoretically less efficient but obviously must be considered.
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customers with only demand can participate actively by exploiting the
fact that many electric loads are energy rather than power loads.
Energy loads require that an average rather than an instantaneous
condition be met. This includes such loads as space conditioning and
melt pots, as opposed to rotating machinery, lights, and computers.
Energy loads may be rescheduled for seconds to minutes to improve power
system behavior without affecting the customer's needs. For such load
control to be effective, two types of information are required:
o A locally measured signal(s) indicates how the customer desire
for service is being fulfilled. For example, is the temperature
of the building being maintained within desired limits? Is the
water level of a tank being maintained between desired limits?
o One or several locally measured or provided signals such as
frequency, voltage, or power flows which provide information on
overall power system dynamic behavior.
The Frequency Adaptive Power Energy Rescheduler (FAPER) is a device which
illustrates these concepts and which has been built in our laboratory.
This device is based on a small microprocessor which accepts a
temperature or water level measurement, measures local frequency, and
then takes the appropriate action.
In the previously mentioned ideal world of instantaneous spot pricing
and perfect customer response, dynamics pricing and spot pricing become
the same thing in many, if not all, areas. Dynamics pricing has been
discussed separately because Homeostatic Control is intended for the real
world.
III. Questions of Regulation
The discussions so far have ignored questions associated with utility
organizational structure and regulation such as
o Which parts of the marketplace are natural monopolies which
should be under jurisdiction of a regulatory commission?
o How are the spot pricing rules used by the Marketplace
Controller specified?
In order to address such questions, several organizational strategies for
the energy marketplace of Figure 1 are discussed.
III.1 Today: Regulation
First, consider an organizational structure based directly on today's
vertically integrated and regulated utilities. All of the different
elements of Figure 1 except the "customers" would be part of the single
regulated utility. This regulated utility would own the bulk generation,
transmission and distribution networks; would operate the Marketplace
Controller; and would provide Information Consultant and Energy Brokerage
services for customers.
With Homeostatic Control implemented under this structure, the
regulatory commission would be responsible for setting the rules and
formulae which the Marketplace Controller uses to compute spot prices,
etc.. At first this seems to be a radical departure from present
practice where the regulatory commission sets the actual rates
themselves. However, if one takes the point of view that, under the
present system, the regulatory commission sets the rates using the
formulae that (revenue) = (costs) + (reasonable rate of return), then the
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concept of the Marketplace Controller computing the actual rates (spot
prices) is not a major departure. The regulatory commission is still
controlling the equations; they are just being solved a lot faster, in
almost real time.
If spot prices are computed using the optimal spot pricing theorem of
Figure 2, the regulated utility may receive either too much or too little
revenue relative to its allowed rate of return. The regulatory
commission would decide how to resolve the problem by use of refunds or
surcharges . Many possibilities exist. The prime constraint is that the
refunding or surcharging mechanism minimize any undesirable modifications
in customer behavior.
Under this regulated structure, customers could still own their own
generation as they wish. Such generators would not be regulated and
customers might make windfall profits or go bankrupt depending on whether
they are clever, lucky, or unlucky. One of the major benefits of
Homeostatic Control is that it provides a climate under which
customer-owned generation can be installed under honest economic
conditions.
III.2 A Possible Tomorrow: Deregulation
One logical extension of unregulated customer generation is
deregulation of all generation. In a similar vein, many separate
unregulated companies, independent of the utility, could provide
Information Consultant and Energy Brokerage services. Hence, one
possible future would consist of:
o Regulated Utility:
- Transmission and Distribution Network
- Marketplace Controller
o Free Enterprise Marketplace Participants
- Customers with
only load
only generation
both generation and load
- Information Consultants
- Energy Brokers
In such a situation all generation is deregulated. With this structure,
the regulatory commission would regulate the transmission, distribution
and marketplace controller parts of the overall system but would only
monitor the behavior of the other participants to insure that collusion
did not occur.
With deregulated generation, the price of electricity would be
determined primarily by marketplace forces. New power plants might be
built using venture capital by groups of individuals or organizations who
felt they had the right technology to meet their predictions of future
need. If their predictions were correct, they would make a profit as the
spot price for their product would exceed their capital and fuel costs.
If their prediction of needs and/or choice of technology were badly in
error, they would lose money and perhaps go bankrupt.
Completely deregulated generation is one possible tomorrow. What
about deregulating transmission and distribution? The optimum spot
pricing theory allows participants to build a line and to buy energy at
one point in the region and sell it at another. Participants will make
money if their transmission or distribution line is better than the
regulated utility's network. However in practice, complete deregulation
of the transmission distribution network seems impractical because of the
difficulty, for example, of preventing any one participant from gaining
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monopoly power over a geographic area. A related organizational question
is: Should transmision and distribution systems be separated? Relative
to the-concepts and theory underlying Homeostatic Control, there is no
theoretical advantage in such separation, and yet there is no reason it
cannot occur. After all, the transmission and distribution systems can
simply view each other as buying and selling partners which, in fact,
occurs today in many areas. Thus the question of whether to have local
coop distribution systems is entirely a matter of local option,
financing, etc. In a similar fashion the size of a regulated
transmission and distribution utility should be just large enough to be
efficient relative to human, computer, and capital resources. There is
no technical or economic need to have a single, national transmission
and/or distribution utility.
There is a tendency to think of possible organizational structures
in terms of economic issues and spot pricing. However, it is important
to remember that power system engineering considerations such as system
security and dynamic response characteristics are at least as important
and must be dealt with effectively before any structure can evolve. It
is with these power systems engineering aspects that the Homeostatic
Control concepts such as microshedding and dynamics pricing play crucial
roles.
The desirability of deregulated generation requires many detailed
studies as deregulation has many practical shortcomings as well as
theoretical and practical values. We have not done such studies.
However, when considering the nature of the problems facing both the
customers and utilities, we feel that such studies involving alternate
organizational structures should be done soon. Homeostatic Control does
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not require nor necessarily imply deregulated generation; Homeostatic
Control does, on the other hand, make deregulated generation possible.
IV. Is It Practical?
A common initial reaction to Homeostatic Control is, "Is it
practical in the real world?" The paragraphs which follow address the
implementation issues associated with the various parts of the
marketplace of Figure 1. They offer answers to one way of implementing
Homeostatic Control. We suspect there are many others.
IV.1 Marketplace Controller
The Marketplace Controller is responsible for many presently
performed power system control and operation functions which will not be
discussed here. Most of the new marketplace functions are based on
present functions. For example, if both 5 Minute Update Spot Price and
24 Hour Update Spot Price are being used, these prices will be computed
using present economic dispatch and unit commitment techniques combined
with demand models, similar to those in use today, but modified to accept
prices as exogenous variables. Of course, if all generation is
deregulated, the Marketplace Controller will let the marketplace compute
the prices. The process of contracting with customers for options
(microshedding and/or generation reserves) which the Marketplace
Controller can exercise is little more than a variation on the present
utility energy control center practice of buying energy options from
neighboring utilities. The extra flexibility and control ability
provided by such options will result in modification of certain normal
emergency state control logics. None of this is trivial, but all can be
achieved by evolving existing, proven methodologies.
21
IV.2 Information Consultants and Energy Brokers
With a marketplace structure based on today's utility system
organization, the regulated utility itself would provide the Information
Consultant and Energy Brokerage services. Since conversion to spot
pricing will not take place instantly for everyone, there will be time to
obtain and analyze the data necessary to enable development of good
models for forecasting future prices and for forming rational brokerage
policies. Much of the existing demand modeling methodology can be used
as a foundation.
Alternatively, the evolution of independent companies offering
Information Consultant and Energy Brokerage services to marketplace
customers could take place naturally. Many small companies might start
to offer services and then the natural pruning process of competition
would reduce the numbers to a relative few in which the public has
confidence. Even when all utility generation is regulated, Information
Consultants and Energy Brokers that are independent of the regulated
utility may be desired.
IV.3 Utility Customer Communication and Interface
The Energy Marketplace cannot function without communcations between
its different parts. The nature of the needed communication links
depends on the types of transactions. There is a big difference in the
communication link needed for an industrial user to talk with an energy
broker and a Marketplace Controller to communicate emergency state
signals to customers. Fortunately, a broad spectrum of communication
media is presently available and many others are under development or
testing. Existing communication systems such as newspapers and
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commercial broadcasts could give price forecasts as they now give weather
forecasts. A variety of different techniques for using power lines or
utility operated radio systems as communication media are now in
competition. Existing telephone lines can be used in the usual way (the
customer dials the Marketplace Controller) or by superimposing signals
which do not interfere with normal telepone operations. Use of
satellites as communcation vehicles is also under active consideration.
It is necessary to consider very carefully the interface between the
customer and utility domains. That interface, in addition to
transmitting electrical energy between the utility and the customer, must
provide an energy usage measurement and recording system of some sort and
perhaps a communications interface. Since one of the basic principles of
Homeostatic Control is customer independence, the utility should have no
control over devices and no direct access to any devices which store
information within the customer's domain. The communications interface
can ensure this by providing a buffer: information flowing across this
interface would always be "sent" by one party or the other.
As an example of a simple interface, a 24 Hour Updated Spot Price
needs only a recording watt meter which stores the hourly energy flows
(postive or negative) for a month. The meter is then read by the meter
person who physically takes the 24 x 30 numbers back to the office where
the month's bill is computed by multiplying by the spot price. Such
recording meters are already commercially available. An electronic
communication interface is not needed because the customer learns the
spot price from the newspaper or by telephoning the utility.
A sophisticated interface for use in an advanced Homeostatic
environment might contain functions such as:
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o Conduct two-way electronic communication between the
Marketplace Controller computer and the customer's computer.
Spot prices are sent to the customer every five minutes.
Utility customer two-way negotiations on microshedding
contracts are conducted hourly. Microshedding signals when
Marketplace Controller has to exercise options arrive in 2
seconds.
o Measure and record real and reactive energy flows every five
minutes.
o Monitor customer response to microshedding signals to see if
the contract is being honored. If not, impose a punitive rate
or completely cut off supply.
o Measure frequency at the customer's location and compute the
economic benefits the customer is to receive because of
adjusting usage or generation in response to frequency
deviations (dynamics pricing).
Such an interface might also monitor harmonic generation and provide
customers with load frequency control signals for direct response. Such
interfaces can be put together today using currently available equipment
but commercial packages would require development efforts.
IV.4 Customer Site Communication and Decision Making
For a simple initial Homeostatic implementation involving just 24
Hour Updated Spot Pricing, an effective consumer-site system can depend
on the customer's own legs and mouth for communication and head for
control. However, with more advanced concepts such as 5 Minute Update
Spot Price, some sort of electronic communication and possible decision
making aids become necessary.
Many large customers already have in place energy management and
control systems which are used to reduce peak load and to reschedule
under time-of-day pricing. For such customers, Homeostatic Control is
little more than a redefinition of the rules under which the energy
management game is played. However, energy management equipment, as it
is now constituted, is expensive to install. Hence, it is limited to
fairly large customers and important energy using processes. Extension
of advanced Homeostatic Control to smaller customers will require cost
reductions of a substantial magnitude. Fortunately, the type of systems
required are not only possible, but will and are being built, if not for
use on Homeostatic Control, then for other purposes.
Consider first the question of customer site communication. If
electronic communication is to be applicable to small customers and small
processes, the equipment itself must not be expensive and must be
relatively easy to use. Most small customers will not be sophisticated.
These requirements dictate the need for a local area data network within
the customer's domain which facilitates installation of various pieces of
equipment in a "plug-in" fashion. There must be standardization of
hardware as well as software so that pieces of equipment can be
mass-produced and installed easily.
In a real sense, the local area data network within the customer's
domain serves as an information analog to the local area power network
(that is, house wiring) found in all buildings. The ease with which
electrical appliances and devices can be installed, and indeed the
relative economy of such devices, relies on the existence of such a local
power network and the standard of voltage and current to which it
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adheres. The same thing should be true for information.
A local area data network adapted to control and monitoring
applications will, in fact, be useful for tasks other than controlling
electricity using devices in response to Homeostatic Control. This
network will exhibit a kind of synergism. The costs associated with the
network itself will be borne by more than one application system. Such a
network could control lighting, intrusion and fire alarm systems, paging,
entertainment systems, etc.
This local area data network has special communications needs. The
messages are generally quite short, although they may be quite frequent.
Often short dialogues are required; for example a space conditioning
controller may inquire about temperature in a given room and expect an
answer. This implies the need for some form of master/slave linking. On
the other hand, if there is to be the capability of handling more than
one system, there should not be a single fixed bus controller. Rather,
each of the several network ports should have the capability of being bus
"master" for a period of time, and then letting another port take over.
With multiple, independent systems using the communications link, there
is a need for a means of arbitration to determine which port can take
control of the link at a particular time. Some of the messages will have
a high urgency in time (such as a command to turn on a room light), while
others will be less urgent (such as a thermostat reading). This suggests
the need for a priority structure, so that urgent messages go ahead of
non-urgent messages.
In response to the above needs for a local area data network adapted
to use in control and monitoring applications, a group at MIT has
specified such a network standard called COMONET which is described in
Appendix A.
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Finally let us consider the issue of customer decision-making under
Homeostatic Control. As discussed earlier, this is just a redefinition
of the rules of the game for large customers who already have
sophisticated energy management and control systems. Customers without
fancy electronics could react to 24 Hour Update Spot Pricing by viewing
the expected price variations under normal conditions as time-of-day
rates and making special adjustments only when abnormal power plant
outages, weather, or fuel shortages cause very high rates. With
microelectronics and advanced Homeostatic Control concepts, the actual
decision making can become a sophisticated blend of electronics and
humans. Residential customers without computer background might buy
computer systems designed initially to allow them to learn and view their
energy management much as an electronic war game. Increased
sophistication could come with practice and experience. Some customers
with computer background would do some of their own programming. In
either case, the computers would provide the vehicle for implementing the
customer's desires when living in a Homeostatic environment.
With special purpose computers as well as with communication,
standardization of software and hardware interfacing, a "plug in"
capability as in COMONET is essential. The tremendous increases in the
performance to cost ratio of computational systems in recent years
promise to put sophisticated hardware within the reach of even the
smallest customers within a few years. Standardized, reproducible
software can be expected to make the complete package affordable and
usable.
The fanciful scenario of Figure 3 illustrates how a residential
customer of the future might live out one day under Homeostatic Control.
V. Implications of Implementation
No discussion of Homeostatic Control would be complete without
consideration of the cost-benefit implications.
V.1 Costs
Money is needed to develop, implement, and operate the Marketplace
Controller, and the communication system between it and the customers.
Communication costs would become quite high if all customers, including
the smallest residence, were on 5-Minute Spot Pricing and were using
sophisticated, frequently updated microshedding contracts. Given today's
prices for electric power and for communication computation systems, the
cost of employing highly sophisticated versions of Homeostatic Control
would exceed the benefits for some customers. Fortunately the level of
Homeostatic Control sophistication (i.e., cost) can be adapted to the
benefits received. Those large industrial customers who are capable and
willing to respond could receive sophisticated five-minute spot pricing
and microshedding signals, while smaller customers or those who do not
have the ability to respond could be on 24-hour update spot prices,
time-of-use rates, or flat rates. A similar picture exists on the
communication computation costs a particular customer might incur in
order to respond effectively to the energy marketplace environment.
Customers could choose the level of sophistication that matches their
particular needs ranging from simple flashing light warning systems to
sophisticated real-time microelectronics. One of the major strengths of
the overall Homeostatic Control framework is this ability to match the
cost incurred to the benefits received.
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Figure 3
A RESIDENTIAL HOMEOSTATIC DAY
6:00 a.m.
7:00 a.m.
7:30 a.m.
10:00 a.m.
12:00 noon
3:00 p.m.
3:05 p.m.
7:00 p.m.
o Home owner wakes up.
o Computer has hot water ready for shower.
o Computer displays its energy use plan for next 24 hours
based on predicted weather and spot price patterns, and on
owner's average lifestyle which computer has learned.
o Owner modifies plan because guests are expected for dinner.
o Owner leaves for work.
o Computer receives revised weather forecast and then changes
its space conditioning strategy for the rest of the day.
o Owner calls computer to say guests are spending the night.
o Computer incorporates space conditioning the guest room
into its strategy.
o Major storm front knocks out many power plants and
transmission lines
o Utility's Marketplace Controller exercises microshedding
options, owner's computer responds by turning off space
conditioning.
o A large quality of supply component is added to the spot
price.
o Computer reacts to very high spot prices by turning off
everything except the refrigerater, freezer and itself.
o Computer calls owner to tell of its emergency actions.
o Owner tells computer to space condition the living room in
spite of the very high prices starting at 6:00 p.m.
o Owner starts pleasant evening in living room with guests.
All enjoy lobster salad, fresh tomatoes vinaigrette and
chilled white wine...
Figure 3
A RESIDENTIAL HOMEOSTATIC DAY (continued)
8:00 p.m. o Power system restoration proceeds rapidly
o Spot price starts to fall and is predicted to be minimum at
3:00 a.m.
o Owner tells computer to have guest room and master bedroom
space conditioned by midnight.
12 midnght o Owner and guests retire
3 a.m. o Computer starts to run dishwasher and laundry machines;
heats water for next morning
o Latest spot price and weather forecasts cause computer to
pre-cool parts of the house so it can "coast" during the
next afternoon.
4 a.m. o Second storm front causes major power system disturbances
which result in system frequency swings.
o Computer cycles electrical usage in phase with frequency
(usage down when frequency down).
o Owner and guests keep sleeping comfortably.
30
The costs to be associated with implementing Homeostatic Control
will be greatly reduced if many present trends in related areas
continue. Utilities are presently considering sophisticated distribution
and automation control systems to provide real-time control of various
elements of a distribution system. Homeostatic Control could be
implemented using such communication capabilities as a basis with a
subsequent major reduction in the cost associated with Homeostatic
Control. Industrial and commercial customers are already installing a
variety of microprocessor-based monitoring and control systems on their
premises. The home computer has already been moved out of the toy
stage. Microprocessor-based residential security monitoring systems are
coming. Given the prior existence of such systems, the addition of
Homeostatic Control response capability would become very much less
expensive for the customers.
V.2 Benefits
Table 1 summarizes some of the major time scales and functions
associated with control, operation, and planning of generation,
transmission, and distribution systems. Customer actions have a similar
decomposition. Homeostatic Control provides benefits in all these time
frames. In the fast control time frames, system dynamics are smoothed
primarily by control of energy type loads. In the longer operational
time frames, the existence of the energy marketplace increases operating
efficiencies. At investment decision time scales, the impacts of
uncertainties in future fuel costs, technology availability, and demand
are reduced because both the customers and the generation, transmission
and distributions systems are responding to changing conditions in a
Functions
Control of System Dynamics
Transient stability
Dynamic stability
Long-term dynamics
System Operation
Economic dispatch
Unit commitment
Maintainance scheduling
Investment Planning
Distribution
Transmission
Generation
Time Frame
0 to 1 second
0.1 to 10 seconds
1 second to 30 minutes
Every 5 minutes
Hourly for week
Weekly for year
1 to 5 years
5 to 20 years
5 to 40 years
Table 1
TIME FRAMES ASSOCIATED WITH MAJOR FUNCTIONS
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cooperative fashion. The overall result is a more robust electric power
system.
A wide variety of control devices are presently used to control
system dynamics. Homeostatic Control would provide additional powerful
new control means to the power system control engineer: namely, the
ability for free, short-term control of energy type loads through
customer response to dynamics pricing and via utility-exercised,
short-term contract options such as microshedding. This could lead to a
major evolution in control philisophy for both normal and emergency state
control. Most fast-acting control might be taken off of large power
plants and placed on the faster, more responsive usage devices. Thus the
large expensive power plants could be operated in a smoother fashion to
do what they do best; generate electric energy efficiently.
To most economists the concept of economically efficient operation
of a supply-demand system holds a particular significance in that it
defines the conditions under which the greatest amount of goods and
services are produced for the least cost. The energy marketplace would
provide a way to get very close to economic efficiency in system
operation. Consider first customer operational decisions relative to
usage. A spot price enables a customer to decide whether the marginal
value of electric energy is sufficiently great to warrant purchasing
electricity at that time. However, we do not envision a world where the
cost of electricity dominates industrial customers' production decisions
or residential customers' lifestyles. Most customers would not worry
about their electric power consumption except at the times when they
provide priorities to their computer systems (if any) and at those
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abnormal times when very high prices exist or are expected. However,
this relatively minor involvement would improve the efficiency of
operation. By adapting to price changes in a routine fashion, the
customers would reduce their overall energy bill without significant
changes in industrial production, residential lifestyles, etc. During
times of system stress when prices are very high, individual customers
who happen to have particularly important operations under way (such as a
batch industrial process or a wedding) can still decide to use the energy.
Relative to the operation of the generation system, the energy
marketplace would automatically cause efficient dispatch of
customer-owned cogeneration or other generating facilities. Spot pricing
combined with some types of microshedding would greatly reduce if not
eliminate the costs of carrying spinning reserves on the major generating
units. However, the biggest improvements in the efficiency of operation
of the generation system occur because of the pricing feedback between
the usage and generation. Fuel would be burned at times and in amounts
which truly best match the customer's actual needs.
Implementation of Homeostatic Control concepts would have major
implications on the types of investment decisions being made by both the
customer and the utility. Some customers would make capital investments
for usage devices to take advantage of changing spot prices, such as
buying storage heating equipment, extra process storage, and more
insulation. Such devices would help customers take advantage of low
prices and avoid high prices and, with a little more sophisticated
decision making, would enable customers to take advantage of
microshedding contracts.
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Homeostatic Control would have an impact on the types of generation
plants being built. Efficient base load units would become more
desirable while peaking units would lose attractiveness. Solar and wind
generation would become more attractive. Homeostatic Control would apply
pressure to strengthen the transmission/distribution system as the
effectiveness of the energy marketplace increases with the capabilities
of the transmission/distribution systems.
Homeostatic Control concepts would also change some of the basic
ways in which investment planning decisions are made. For example, in
generation expansion planning the concept of a reliability constraint on
the allowable loss of load probability would become obsolete as
generation investment decisions would now turn on the price customers are
willing to pay. Questions of reliability of customer service would
become concentrated at the distribution level which is where such
discussions belong in the first place. The overall result would be a
more robust system which is less demanding from a planning point of view
because both the generation system and the customers would be responding
together to the unexpected changes in fuel costs, technology, etc. which
are bound to occur in the future.
If some sort of deregulation of electric generation takes place in
the future and if such deregulation is done along the lines of an energy
marketplace, new capital markets for generation expansion would open up.
A completely free-floating spot price would enable venture capitalists to
make large profits if they were able to predict the market and provide
the right technology at the right time to meet a real need.
The energy marketplace and spot pricing would provide a more
favorable climate for renewable generation technologies such as solar,
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wind, and hydro. In an energy marketplace, the capacity credit concept
which can reduce the attractiveness of renewable generation is no longer
viable. In an energy marketplace a kilowatt hour is worth just as much
from a coal or nuclear power plant as from a solar or wind power plant.
The impact of the stochastic nature of wind and solar generation on
system spinning reserve requirements would be greatly reduced if not
eliminated under Homeostatic Control.
The existence of an open energy marketplace would encourage
innovative new technologies on both usage and generation sides. There
would, of course, be a major surge in innovative methods and technologies
for customer site energy management systems. As another example,
consider an integrated residential system consisting of heat pump, solar
array, electric resistance back-up and gas-fired (natural or
coal-gasified) cogeneration. The attractiveness of such a system would
be increased greatly if it could play the energy marketplace and buy when
the price is cheap and sell when the price is high. In a similar fashion
consider an industrial complex wherein a basic heat source (coal or
nuclear) is integrated into a system which can generate various quanities
of steam, chemicals, industrial gases and electricity, depending on
energy marketplace conditions.
Homeostatic Control has social benefits that go beyond economic and
engineering efficiency. The customers would become sensitive to the
actual costs and problems faced by the utilities. Such understanding
would provide a better rapport between the two. Today's regulatory
process has yielded a complex set of ad hoc special rates for special
cases which are confusing to customers and which cause distrust of both
the utility and the regulatory commission. Optimum spot pricing provides
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a solid, self-consistent basis for establishing rates that are fair to
all concerned. The simplifications in the basic rate-making process
resulting from Homeostatic Control would prove to be one of its major
benefits.
VI. Revolution or Evolution?
We believe that Homeostatic Control represents a structured
evolution of the electric power system. It is a blending together of
many individual directions which are currently under way within the
industry. It builds upon a decade of revolution in communication and
computation and nearly a decade of continued development in customer load
management. To us, it is a natural and beneficial way of directing
changes which are certain to occur in the future. We expect
implementation of Homeostatic Control to evolve gradually. Large
industrial customers are likely to be the first to find marketplace
participation to be to their economic advantage. They will be followed
by other customers with special types of large energy use and eventually
by many residential customers. The economic benefits will be
continuously netted against the cost of control and metering equipment.
Throughout this whole evolution, the benefits of greater efficiency will
be shared by all customers and the utilities will become better able to
deal with the massive uncertainties they face.
Of course, historically, most revolutionary ideas turned out to be
just an evolution of old ideas to meet a new set of conditions and
needs. The ideas were considered revolutionary because their
implementation had a large impact. Homeostatic Control was not needed in
the past because the cost of communication and computation was high and
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the price of electric energy was low. Now there are new conditions and
needs; the costs of communication and computation are still falling while
the price of electric energy is high and rising. Implementation of
Homeostatic Control can have major impacts on costs and how we as a
society treat electric energy. In this sense, Homeostatic Control is
revolutionary as well as evolutionary.
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Appendix A: COMONET
COMONET is a fully distributed communications network with all
arbitration and control functionality provided by the separate interface
ports. These ports interact through two signal paths, the data path and
the control path. (which could be separate wires, two frequency
multiplexed paths, etc.) The data path transfers all systems level bit
strings and all link level command words. The control path supports the
distributed arbitration structure. No central link controller is
required to perform arbitration or routine housekeeping.
A bus port requests link access by sending an access request word
(which designates the urgency of the request) over the control path.
Each system port keeps track of the number of pending requests in each
urgency class by counting access requests and signals indicating that a
port relinquishes link control.
Once a link port reaches the top of its request queue, it becomes
link master, and controls operation of the link by issuing command words
over the data path. These control words are:
SID Slave Identification
MSD Master Send Data
SSD Slave Send Data
These command words operate to change the state of the link. For
example, if the master issues the command word SID, each of the other
ports examines the next bit string to see if that bit string matches its
address. If MSD is issued, the port previously identified as a "slave"
port interprets the next bit string as data and passes it on to the
attached system component. If SSD is issued, the port previously
identified as a "slave" port is expected to send data. The link master
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relinquishes control of the network by issuing a special control word
EOF, for End of Function.
It is possible to include a collision-detection, delayed
re-transmission scheme in this link protocol to ensure robustness. In
addition, the bus is provided with a timeout mechanism to make up for
missing messages.
